A Response
The Articles Editors
Why are we publishing a set of essays debating the merits of
the student-run law review? Similar commentary has appeared
before, with apparently little effect on legal scholarship. But
these critiques have come largely from outsiders. Adding the
perspective of a current board may reveal hidden benefits of the
current system and help screen out impracticable reforms. More
important, however, we hope that our response will help bring
about change, which seems improbable, if not impossible, without
some measure of student involvement.
Professor Lindgren's piece reminds us of the potential excesses of student control and suggests further research into student
editing practices, coupled with an immediate increase in faculty
control. Professor Gordon demonstrates that the current regime
has its benefits; unlike Lindgren, she thinks that research should
precede any substantial change in law review practices. We agree
with Professor Lindgren that useful reform need not await the
results of an exhaustive study of the current system. Yet we
believe that Lindgren's proposed solution (increased faculty
control) is misguided. A better way to respond to Lindgren's
concerns, while preserving the educational benefits of student
autonomy, would be to institute moderate reforms of the current
"market" in law review services. If journals gave professors more
candid information about their selection and editing policies,
professors could influence the journal market as educated consumers of student services, rather than through direct faculty
control.
I. SELECTING ARTICLES
Professor Lindgren makes three principal points regarding
articles selection. Law review boards privilege their interests
over those of authors or subscribers; they have an elitist preference for credentials over substance; and they distort articles
selection through their ignorance and their bias, as future clerks,
in favor of federal subjects. Professor Gordon also advocates reform, though she believes the benefits of student control outweigh its vices.
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Obviously, student interests influence what gets published in
law reviews. But this influence is probably small. In our experience, we publish what we get, and in more or less the same proportions in which we get it. This is not simply a matter of professors catering to our desires. If professors were not the source of
most subject-matter bias, their writing would likely shift to different fields after they received tenure. Yet we have found that
submissions from tenured professors continue to concentrate on
corporate law, constitutional law, and other federal topics. To the
extent that student and faculty preferences diverge, students are
more likely to seek out "new" topics-those not already substantially overrepresented in faculty submissions.
Student preferences may not differ much from those of professors, but Professor Lindgren is correct to note that they depart
substantially from those of practitioners. We suspect that this is
just a matter of law reviews accurately discerning their audience.
Law review articles seem to be read primarily by professors,
while practitioners and judges seem to rely more heavily on student-written comments. While we might change our audience
slightly by publishing more practical articles, increased practitioner interest would, we think, be more than offset by declining
faculty readership.
Concerning elitism, it surely happens that editors sometimes
select articles on the basis of credentials rather than merit, perhaps due to insecurity about their ability to evaluate merit. We
hope that this is rare; certainly many concerned and capable
editors know when they reach the limits of their substantive
knowledge, and then seek faculty advice-a service we have
found our faculty willing to perform. If editors will not do this,
perhaps they should rely on author credentials rather than their
own judgments. After all, professors get jobs at elite schools precisely because they are good, original writers-few elite schools
base even a part of their tenure decisions on teaching ability.
We agree with Professor Lindgren that the effects of student
preferences and elitism on articles selection should be remedied,
although we think he exaggerates the extent of the problem.
Nevertheless, we cannot fully endorse his two proffered solutions-blind review of submissions and increased faculty involvement.
In theory, we think blind reads could improve the integrity of
the selection process. We would not, however, urge their immediate adoption, for blind reads have costs as well as benefits. For a
review such as ours, with a current articles staff of two and no
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secretarial staff, their administrative costs would be considerable.
At the same time, their benefits are uncertain; acknowledgement
notes, textual references to earlier articles by the same author,
and the content of footnotes provide numerous clues to the
author's identity, and indeed, often state it outright. In addition,
even if the process were fully blind, we fear that its effect on
publication decisions would not justify the additional costs. The
stark truth is that authors submit many articles that do not meet
basic criteria of logic and clarity, and somewhat fewer that do. In
the end, nearly all the good ones and far too many of the bad are
published; eliminating some small element of bias from the selection process might little alter this result. Nonetheless, even if it
does not much alter the final mix of articles published, a policy of
blind reads would have the benefit of avoiding the appearance of
impropriety.
Faculty supervision has still less to recommend it. While we
have turned to members of our faculty for subject-matter expertise in making particular publication decisions, assigning final
selection decisions to faculty is neither desirable nor feasible. It
would be undesirable for students because some measure of authority and responsibility is an important incentive to do better
work. Nor would professors benefit from faculty control if, as a
result, student edits of their work would be less careful. In addition, dividing responsibility between students and faculty might
actually provoke turf wars that would harm all concerned.
Even law review readers outside the legal academy might
find faculty control undesirable. It may be reasonable for law
reviews to cater primarily to law professors, but they should at
least try to make their articles accessible to other readers. Student editing promotes accessibility because, as Professor Gordon
notes, student comprehension requires both less technical writing
and better documentation of the article's relation to other work
in its field.
Not only is faculty oversight undesirable, it is probably unworkable. We doubt that most faculty members are interested in
devoting their time to selecting law review articles. If they were,
they would start new faculty-run journals, or at least press their
services more insistently upon law reviews. Most faculty, however, prefer writing to supervisory work, and it would be hard for
law reviews to offer them compensation sufficient to induce them
to redirect their efforts. Perhaps student freedom from faculty
oversight persists simply because student labor is cheap.
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In short, we agree that the selection process for law review
articles is not perfect, and that student editors should try to
improve it. Blind reads and increased faculty involvement might
help, but neither is a panacea; Professor Gordon is right to suggest further research and reflection before they are adopted.
I.

EDITING ARTICLES

When it comes to the excesses of student editing, we believe
that Professor Lindgren's point is well-taken. It is true that, as
Professor Gordon points out, Lindgren overlooks some benefits
that student editing offers to editors, readers, and even to authors. Still, we think editors should adopt his rules, because they
would safeguard against the perverse incentives of the current
system.
The structure and incentives of law review editing virtually
guarantee over-editing. In the excessively hierarchical structure
of most law reviews, an article may pass through the hands of
five or six students, each with an incentive to prove his or her
ability to edit. Add to this a tendency to approach an edit like a
final exam-the more issues spotted, the better the edit-and it's
surprising that pieces are even recognizable when finally published. Thus, even if students are, individually, better editors
than Professor Lindgren suggests, light editing should be our
goal for systemic reasons.
Our endorsement of a light-editing rule is not, however,
unqualified; significant costs may accompany such a rule. First, a
number of genuinely insightful articles might never be selected.
Some exciting thinkers are, unfortunately, not equally capable
writers. Otheis submit their articles in a state of obvious incompleteness, expecting student editors to fill in the blanks. There
are two kinds of writers-those who see the editing process as
the students' opportunity to create work for them, and those who
see it as their opportunity to assign work to the students-and
Professor Lindgren would deny us the opportunity to publish the
second kind, whatever benefits their work may offer to readers.
Second, accepting the (somewhat elitist) position that, on average, better writers work at better schools, a light editing policy
would bias selection in favor of well-credentialed authors. On
balance, however, we believe that the benefits of light editing are
likely to outweigh its costs.
As in the selection process, we have doubts about the greatly
increased faculty role in editing that Lindgren appears to advocate. That practice would impose direct costs on professors (edit-
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ing is even less appealing than articles selection) and would
demoralize students. Even if this would produce better legal
scholarship (we and Professor Gordon think it would not), it
would deprive the students of much of the educational value of
law review work. This objection cannot easily be overstated; perhaps the benefits law reviews offer to authors are much less
important than their educational role for students.
III. A MARKET SYSTEM FOR SELECTION AND EDITING
Whatever the problems of the student-run law review, faculty control is not the answer. Still, no reform is not the answer
either. We believe that student editors are capable of initiating
some needed changes on their own, without the benefit of further
research or faculty guidance. First among these is a sensible
editing policy. Light editing, together with advance notice of
suggested changes (and the opportunity to veto), has always been
our goal. This policy has three advantages. It preserves the
author's original voice by preventing rewriting for style alone.
Also, treating light editing as the norm allows us to reserve
heavy editing for the rare cases in which it is truly needed. Finally, the author's veto gives her ultimate control of her own
work, no matter how extensive our suggestions.
More important, students can take the initiative in improving the market for law review services. By disclosing their selection and editing policies, journals can allow authors to exert their
influence as consumers, without actually having to run the journals themselves. Eventually, among competitive journals, the
more popular policies will attract the more desirable articles, and
other journals will be obliged to change to compete.
We have decided to adopt the following disclosure statement;
other journals might adopt different statements, varying in content based on their editorial preferences. Ideally, journals would
print these statements at the beginning of their reviews, as we
have, to make authors better educated consumers of student
editing services.
The Editors welcome submissions of manuscripts for
publication in the Law Review. Our policies are as follows:

The University of Chicago Law Review

I. Selection.

The Law Review seeks to publish articles making a
significant, original contribution to their field. In general, this precludes the publication of case notes or other
narrowly focused works. Essays and book reviews will
be considered on a very limited basis.
Because our editorial policy affords substantial
deference to authors, articles must be both well written
and completely argued at the time of subiiission. Limited resources prevent us from generally filling in the
gaps of an otherwise significant article, or substantially
correcting its style.
II. Editing.
Both the argument of an article and its "voice"
should be the creation of the author. Our edits are intended to hone the author's vision, rather than replacing it with our own.
To this end, after completing our substantial round
of editing, we send the author a "redlined" copy of the
manuscript that shows all changes made. Substantial
changes are accompanied by substantive comments or
questions. Our changes are meant as reasoned suggestions, not editorial edicts, and we will respect the
author's judgment regarding whether the changes
should, in the end, be made.
CONCLUSION

We hope that this exchange encourages law review boards to
initiate thoughtful change. In particular, we suggest that law
reviews publish their selection criteria for articles and their editing policies. This would both reassure authors and encourage
them to send their work to journals whose policies they endorse.

